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useless for anybody to write on early marriage after the appearance of his own work on "The Primitive Family."

EDWARD WESTERMARCK.

LONDON.

"MORAL DISTINCTIONS"—AN EXPLANATION.

In reference to the reply of Mr. Muirhead to what he calls my "accusations," may I say in explanation,—

1. That I do not consider the area of conduct affected by moral obligation to be the same as that affected by legal compulsion. I think the former much wider.

2. I think that a man has large duties to his wife and children.

3. When speaking of self-regarding acts as contrasted with other regarding ones, I do not consider that a man's wife and children are himself. It seems to me sophistical to do so.

4. Is not the function of the moralist to observe and build upon distinctions rather than to seek to break them down? Every rule of morals or jurisprudence shades off at its margin, so that you cannot say precisely where it ends; but that does not show that it is not sound. That I am free while a dangerous lunatic is confined depends upon legal rules which cannot be scientifically defined.

NEVILLE TEBBUTT.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION. By Professor Edward Caird, LL.D., D.C.L. In two volumes. Glasgow: MacLehose & Sons, 1893.

The Gifford Foundation, whatever other results it may yield, has merited the gratitude of this generation through having furnished an occasion for Professor Caird's lectures. The work is an *apology* for religion, and for the Christian religion in particular of a higher strain than has hitherto been heard in English literature. In substance the work represents the ripest fruits of a modern

idealistic philosophy, a philosophy which has shown itself capable of assimilating to the fullest extent the new conceptions with which recent scientific and historical research has armed the investigator of man's nature and destiny. The relatively freer form of exposition appropriate to oral addresses, while it has the disadvantage of excluding more abstract discussion, affords full scope to Professor Caird's remarkable gift of lofty, serious, and rich eloquence. The combination of speculative theory with interpretations of the great historical movements of religious faith,—a combination not arbitrarily imposed, but necessitated by the mode in which the main problem is regarded,—is that best adapted to call forth the full powers of the author; and, let it be said in a word, he has risen to the height of his great argument.

The ground-plan of the lectures is easily apprehended and stated. It involves and rests upon two fundamental conceptions: one, that of the principle of religion as an integral and constituent element in reason or consciousness as such; the other, that of evolution or development as the process of organic change whereby what is the full and true meaning of the principle is realized and manifested. The closer analysis of these fundamental ideas forms the more abstract portion of the work; the study of the exemplification and verification of them in the history of the main types of the world's religions gives to them a more concrete and definite significance. Not, however, that abstract analysis and historical verification are to be absolutely severed, even in treatment. It is part of the best lesson of modern philosophy, a lesson the author enforces, that speculation must not divorce itself from the actual life of the human spirit, and that only in the contents of the movement of thought does reflective analysis lay hold of the form of the idea it seeks to purify from contingent surroundings and express in all its generality. At the same time it is to be said that the intimate union of speculative analysis with historic interpretation has its own dangers, that it may substitute an imperfect and hastily derived *Vorstellung* for a true notion, and that it may readily lead to grave misapprehension of the actual. The *Rechts-philosophie* of Hegel may be fairly adduced as containing more than one signal illustration of the double danger. And he who would find in the Christian faith, for example, the completed realization of the rational principle of religion, may discover, to his cost, that the conception is of doubtful finality, and that the correspondence of historic fact thereto is dependent on a reading of the Christian

faith as at any time presented which is of more than doubtful historic worth.

Religion as a constituent of human reason the author traces to the necessary presence in consciousness of the idea of God as co-existing and correlated with the equally fundamental ideas of the world and self. The antithesis between *self* and the *world*, in more technical language, between *subject* and *object*, involves and is only possible through consciousness of the unity within which the opposing elements are embraced. Some consciousness of this embracing unity, however inchoate in form, is necessarily present; man can no more rid himself of it than he can get rid of the consciousness of the object or of himself. There is thus for all religions a common *principle* rather than a common *definition*; they are the varied results in which one living germinative force embodies itself. In their relation to this principle religions have their basis of agreement, not in any external features or doctrines which they might possess in common.

It is a necessity of reason which lies under the idea of the absolute unity wherein the counter elements of all experience, the subject and object, man and nature, are viewed in an intelligible relation to one another. On the necessity, indeed, rests the claim of religion to a recognition as an integral and original element of human thought, a recognition wholly independent of the particular form which the fundamental conceptions of the absolute unity may assume. "Every rational being is as such a religious being." Just as "inner" and "outer" in experience, the subject and the object, are known only as related to, yet different from one another, so the synthesis of these two carries with it the presupposition of a third term, higher than either, of whose unity they in their action and reaction are the manifestation.

Accepting for the moment this account of the rational basis of religion, we can readily understand why the author turns at once to the consideration of one characteristic of the absolute unity, a characteristic so abstract that it enters naturally into the more purely philosophical discussions of the idea of God, and at the same time presents itself as operative in even the simplest phases of concrete religious belief. Subject and object as opposed to one another, and so as limiting, determining one another,—outer and inner experience as complexes of related facts, more or less intelligible,—carry with them the mark of finitude. The absolute unity, as opposed to either, is conceived, more or less clearly, as

the non-finite, the infinite. The author has but little trouble in showing the inadequacy of two main ways in which this important feature has been represented. The infinite is not simply a greater finite, one more term added to the series; nor is it the indeterminate and indeterminable, that of which just nothing can be said. "The infinite itself must be conceived, not merely as that which the finite is not, but as that which includes and explains it; not merely as an indeterminate background of the finite, but as a self-determining principle which manifests itself in all the determinations of the finite without losing its unity with itself." The infinite, in brief, must be thought, not imagined, and the history of religious views is to a large extent the exhibition of the constant conflict between the imperfections of the concrete images and the demands of the fundamental conception they embody, a conflict in and through which the conception itself acquires its full significance.

The author would readily admit that in the idea of the absolute unity, which seems thus to be presupposed in all finite experience, we have, after all, only the abstract form of our problem; and, perhaps he would further admit that the more concrete determination of it just given, as the idea of a principle which unfolds itself in the richness of finitude, is apt to suggest interpreting images that have no justification in the idea itself. The nature of a uniting principle can never be indifferent to the natures of the differing elements united; and if we, for any reason, reduce to the vast characteristic of distinct finites the rich factors of our complex actual experience, we shall correspondingly reduce our conception of the embracing unity to the bare negative that is here rejected. All we can secure is the somewhat cautionary result, that the infinite is neither to be conceived as a *legend* which has no relation to the finite nor as a mere sum of finites. The content of the idea which shall satisfy our demands remains to be determined otherwise, and obviously depends on and must vary with the content assigned to the finites, which are held apart and yet united.

All this is perfectly appreciated by the author, and receives full recognition in his treatment of the idea of evolution or development. "The permanence of the three great limiting ideas by which our whole life, theoretical and practical, is governed does not include the vicissitudes of a long process of development, in which each of them takes into itself the most varied content, and becomes in a sense transformed by assimilating it. But the trans-

formation is always organic, always held within the limits of the identity of our life; and its last result is therefore only a more adequate consciousness of the meaning and relative value of the ideas by which it was guided and stimulated in all its progress." The religious idea which is rooted in man's consciousness of himself and of the world only acquires definiteness through its own development, and only its last stage clearly shows what was contained in it from the first. The history of religions is just religion progressively defining itself. At every stage the religion is the expression of the fullest conception human reason can form of the unity of its own experience; at every stage, then, it has to submit to the application of the same final test, how far it coheres with man's reason and conscience, how far, that is, it really contains a conception of unity which does reunite the consciousness of himself and of the world that man has reached.

To the idea of evolution the author devotes special attention; and it is natural and necessary he should do so, for on it rests one half, perhaps the most important half, of all his treatment of religion. We cannot think he has been completely successful in clearing it up or in evading the manifold difficulties that beset the application of it; but before indicating the doubts we entertain on these points it is desirable to follow, as briefly as may be, the author's own exposition of the idea, and to see what results it yields in his hands. The conceptions which come forward are all so large and complicated, in many cases are condensations of so much concrete and debatable matter, that it is hard to feel sure of the precise significance attached to them, and equally hard to decide whether difference of opinion from him has real ground or not.

The fundamental features of *development* on which the author lays stress are, first, that nothing arises in it *de novo* which is not in some way performed or anticipated from the beginning,—in other words, a development is the gradual unfolding, becoming explicit of what is already implicit; second, the process of change in the continuous unification of difference; and, thirdly, the successive changes, the increasing richness and complexity brought forward, are so far from being incompatible with the unity and identity of the subject of change that only through them is his own self-identical existence fully realized. If to this there be added a term playing an important part in the author's discussion, *viz.*, *manifestation*, a summary expression of the varied differences and integrations making up the manifold of a developing life, we have

the abstract outlines of his determination of the notion which finds its best illustration in self-consciousness, and which is applied to the whole history of religions.

In the development of consciousness, whether of self, or world, or God, there is traceable the constant interaction of ideas, dimly appreciated, and with a content that is at first implicit only, and of forms of concrete embodiment, representation, the element of difference. In and through the struggle of these opposing elements the fundamental idea itself acquires new definiteness and depth, and in the light of what is thus gained an interpretation is possible of the more inchoate stages that have preceded. And in the whole evolution, as in each of its partial phases, the same typical movement is exemplified. The history of the development of any one form of consciousness, then, is not to be contrasted with and severed from its philosophical treatment. It is only through the evolution of a principle that the meaning of the principle becomes apparent; it is only in the last most fully developed form of the religious idea that the true significance of that idea can be realized and expressed in the more abstract fashion of speculative philosophy.

The larger part of the author's work is devoted to a broad and luminous sketch of the evolution of religious consciousness or of the idea of God. Proceeding on the ground that the first implicit consciousness of the absolute unity must be embodied in representative forms drawn from the experience of the objective world or of self, and that in time reference to the object precedes consciousness of the object, the author sees in the pre-Christian religions the exemplification of one-sided objectivity and of one-sided subjectivity. The more objective religions, tending to conceive of the absolute unity after the fashion of a natural thing, or, at all events, placing God in special and almost exclusive relation to nature, have as their typical, highest representative the Hellenic mythology. The more subjective, conceiving of God as in especial relation to the inner man, as pre-eminently the *moral* ruler, are best represented historically by the Hebrew religion.

It is not easy to be perfectly satisfied with the broad division thus indicated, and to feel convinced that all the manifold minor characteristics of the various types of religion falling under either category are really in subordination to the more general mark; in a word, one might doubt whether such abstract categories of thought, as *object* and *subject*, are well adapted to serve as instru-

ments for laying out historic material. What lies beyond all doubt, however, is the attractive and stimulating character of the author's handling of the several portions of his material. Lectures IX. and XI. are peculiarly excellent specimens of his method.

In the fundamental principle of Christianity the author finds the true and final form of the religious consciousness, a reconciliation of the antithesis which in one-sided acceptation had slowly worked itself out in pre-Christian faiths. The Christian idea is that of God as a spirit manifesting himself both in nature and in the inner life of man,—immanent in nature and yet transcending it, and making it a means to the higher life of spirit,—the presupposition, the life and the end of all,—a living God, the inspiring source of and eternal realization of the moral ideal of man. In the Christian religion, the idea of God dimly present in even the simplest phases of conscious life first becomes explicit. There, and there only, has thought attained an adequate representation of that absolute reconciling unity, the constant need for which had been the animating force in all its efforts after completed understanding of experience, after a perfectly harmonious conception of man and his relations to the sum of existence.

The main portion of the author's second volume is devoted to the treatment of the Christian principle as first expressed in the perfect practical idealism of the founder of the Christian faith, and to a consideration of the development which that principle has itself undergone, at first in the universalizing and deepening of it in the Pauline and Johannine theologies, and then through the manner in which it assimilated throughout the Middle Ages the philosophical and social ideas of its surroundings, and lastly in the Reformation and its sequel. It may be that there are in this broad historical sketch some points open to attack. Perhaps it is not possible to make the separation which the author seems to mark, in the case of the teachings of Christ, between the principle or spirit discoverable there and the conceptions through which that spirit was realized by those even who were most animated by it. In other words, it may be doubted whether it is legitimate to free the teachings of Christ so completely from theological conceptions as seems here to be done. One may hesitate a little as to whether light is thrown on the general outline of development within Christianity by the antithesis of subjective and objective. But these minor difficulties do not prevent full appreciation and enjoyment of the rich exposition here given of the gradual unfolding of the

Christian faith, from its germinal principle down to the form in which, purified and deepened by the conflicts it has gone through, it offers itself as in its simple elements adequate to all the needs of life, and in harmony with the highest, most elaborated results of reflective thought. What was once seized in unreflective fashion, in the vivid intuitions of faith, is in accordance with the more sober, more impersonal utterances of reason. For religion as for philosophy, the meaning of the universe is spiritual. The finitude of man, with the consciousness necessarily accompanying it, of the infinite, all the many contradictions of his theoretical and practical experience, find explanation and reconciliation in the conception of nature and man as the continuous manifestation of a spiritual life, a life, that is, whose nature is seized by us in the ideals we form, of truth and beauty and goodness.

It is not easy to turn from the rich, though chastened eloquence of the words in which the author concludes his argument, and to ask how far it is possible to accept the position he is most of all concerned to enforce, that there is real identity of purport between the philosophical idea and the fundamental elements of the Christian faith.

The essence of the whole argument has been the coincidence between the speculative notion of the ultimate unity of experience as determined by idealist philosophy, and the contents of the highest type of religious faith as historically represented by Christianity,—at all events, when Christianity is purified from certain extraneous adjuncts. From the philosophical point of view, the objective and subjective, nature and man, become rationally interpretable in their reciprocal relations only when conceived as the common manifestations of one spiritual life, which unfolds itself or reveals itself in them, and the character of which is to be discerned, in accordance with the very idea of evolution, only in the highest form of its manifestation, in the moral life of self-conscious mind. On the historical side, Christianity, in the spirit of its doctrine, presents itself as the first fully adequate exposition of a belief reconciling nature and man in the broad conception of a universe spiritual in its significance, a moral government with infinite loving goodness as its principle, a conception which at once satisfies the theoretical demand of intellect and affords an all-comprehensive guidance for practice. There is agreement in that both—philosophical idea and Christian faith—recognize a spiritual life as the ultimate fact in existence, in that both bring together nature

and humanity by viewing them as the forms in which that life is revealed, in that both accept the highest ideals the human reason is found capable of forming as the most adequate interpretations of the nature of the ultimate principle revealing itself in existence, and, finally, in that both tend, when fully worked out, to an identical determination of man's appropriate attitude towards the ultimate ground of things,—for Christianity as for philosophy, the service of God is the service of man.

The difficulties inherent in this subtle *rapprochement* of philosophy and religion are not diminished, but increased when there is taken into account what the author has further to say of the character of the ultimate spiritual life. Fully recognizing the difficulty raised, he yet connects with the more general notions he has been employing the more special thought of the ultimate unity as a self-conscious, that is, personal being; and he would probably admit that, broadly speaking, in the presence or absence of this feature would be found a crucial test of the agreement or disagreement of historical Christianity with the philosophical idea. The author has not discussed at length this highly important portion of his argument; but he lays some stress on the connection of the view briefly expressed by him with his general treatment of evolution, and it may fairly be connected with what he has to say of Kant's peculiar *subjectivism* in regard to the idea of God, and of the *subjective* synthesis of experience which lies at the basis of the Positivist view of religion. But even were the idea of evolution as employed by him more clear and satisfactory than it seems to us, it is doubtful whether it will support the weight of the conclusion thus rested on it. Perplexing as the notion of *manifestation* is, it becomes all the more difficult when we are called upon to conceive of that which is manifested as an infinite self-conscious personality, distinct from and not only revealing himself to but in the realm of finite spirits and of nature. In the light of this interpretation of the ultimate unity, evolution as the author employs it has no other meaning than that which in the far-back history of speculation was assigned to it by Aristotle, and it ought never to be forgotten that with Aristotle the notion of evolution was but the correlative of a thought which often in the work before us seems likewise to play its part, the thought of a complete, pre-existent plan which was gradually unfolded. It is true that the author, in reference to a special question, has explicitly rejected the view which interprets the future as coming from the present "by the

unfolding of an already completed life which contains already pre-formed in it all that it can ever manifest" (ii. 103); but he has allowed himself repeatedly to employ expressions which can with difficulty be cleared from that misconception; and when the idea of evolution is applied, not to the isolated phenomena where its special sense can be secured by due inclusion of the determining conditions, but to the universe as a whole, it seems to us that his exposition leads to precisely the *impasse* before which the late T. H. Green obviously found himself at a stand.

Perhaps one might hazard the conjecture that we are all too apt to interpret hastily the ultimate notion of a unity of experience. It is a purely formal notion, and its further determination is easily biassed by a false or inadequate mode of expressing the opposites, the *differents*, that are supposed to enter into it. Some of the best work of the author in these lectures is devoted to clearing up the precise nature of the relation that must be assumed between subject and object, and yet at times he seems to proceed on the very abstract antithesis he is most successful in destroying. The synthesis that is sought for is a synthesis in and for thought only. Nothing of its significance is lost, even if on that account it be called subjective; nothing is gained by pressing the need of an objective synthesis which, after all, can only mean a more or less pictorial representation symbolizing the thought involved. There are doubtless defects in Kant's mode of handling the final idea of reason, but they are hardly remedied by seeking for that idea an interpretation that shall give its contents a quasi-objective mode of existence.

We can hardly think, then, that idealistic philosophy has done so much as the author claims for it,—“that it has for the first time furnished us with something like a rational proof” of the Christian faith. That philosophy has still much to do before it can with full assurance rest satisfied that it has “named” the truth of things. And a doubt in this respect extends itself inevitably to the historical treatment which finds throughout the past of religious consciousness a slow but unmistakable development towards a definite form of belief. It is hardly possible that a historical review from such a stand-point should not do, even unwittingly, injustice to the facts themselves. The fundamental antithesis of subjective and objective religions, which the author consistently applies, seems at times misleading. As example let there be taken the place assigned to the Stoic system. It is, we are convinced, nothing but

the prejudice of a once accepted view of the historical development of philosophy which can induce any critic to find in the Stoic philosophy a representation of the subjective position. So, too, one may doubt whether it is historically sound to treat Protestantism within the limits of the circle of Christian ideas only. It would be, perhaps, more in accordance with the true historic facts to regard it as one pulse of the great movement of human reason to which in some other pronounced phases the name Renaissance has been applied. But on these aspects of the historical side of Professor Caird's work it is impossible to speak briefly. Merely to indicate doubt or difference of opinion is of small value, and to treat the matters as they deserve would exceed the bounds of any notice of his book.

R. ADAMSON.

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THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS. By Herbert Spencer. Vol. II. London: Williams & Norgate, 1893. Pp. xii., 487.

The larger part of this volume is made up of the discussion of Justice, which forms Part IV. of Mr. Spencer's "Principles," and which was so admirably reviewed by Professor Royce in a former number of this JOURNAL (Vol. II., No. 1, pp. 117-123). Parts V. and VI. ("Negative Beneficence" and "Positive Beneficence") are much shorter and much less substantial, and are indeed, on the whole, very disappointing. In the preface to Volume I. Mr. Spencer stated, with reference to these two parts, that he was especially anxious to be able to complete them, "because, in the absence of them, the divisions already published will leave on nearly all minds a very erroneous impression respecting the general tone of evolutionary ethics. In its full scope, the moral system to be set forth unites sternness with kindness; but thus far attention has been drawn almost wholly to the sternness. Extreme misapprehensions and misstatements have hence resulted." The two parts now for the first time published will no doubt to some extent modify the impression previously conveyed, but not, I think, to such an extent as to alter one's view of the "general tone" of the system. Even in the chapters specially devoted to Beneficence the qualifications seem on the whole more prominent than the positive injunctions; and the latter are often so commonplace in their character that it is open to doubt whether it was worth while to elaborate them in so systematic a form. Mr. Spencer is evi-